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Bringing Unions Back In: Labour and Left Governments in Latin America 
Abstract 
In the 2000s an unprecedented wave of left-party victories in presidential elections 
swept across Latin America. Although scholars have studied variation among left regimes 
and how these regimes differ from neoliberal-era predecessors, few have addressed the 
role of labour unions and labour policy under the Left. We argue that ‘bringing unions 
back in’ to the analysis of left governments’ performance sharpens distinctions with 
neoliberal governments and unsettles existing typologies. We review the labour policies 
of left governments in four countries—Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina—to show 
how a labour lens enriches our understanding of left governments in the region. 




By the mid-2000s an unprecedented wave of left-party victories in presidential elections 
had taken hold across Latin America. Not surprisingly, studies of the rise and 
performance of left governments followed. These studies sought to identify what made 
left governments distinctive. For instance, scholars pointed to left governments’ shared 
interest in the more equitable distribution of resources (Weyland, Madrid and Hunter 
2010). At the same time, analysts noted the remarkable continuity between the economic 
policies of left governments and those of their immediate predecessors (Petras and 
Veltmeyer 2009; Kaufman 2011). Given this continuity, much of the literature on left 
governments focused on their social policies and goals to identify what made them ‘Left’. 
Studies also pointed to variation in the policies and governing styles of left 
governments. Accordingly, analysts created typologies of left governments. Although 
some of these were criticised for being too Manichean, in effect distinguishing between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ left governments, most typologies of left governments drew upon the 
social goals and electoral bases of the Left (Castañeda 2006; Schamis 2006; Roberts 
2007, 2008; Cameron 2009). While organised labour was recognised as a support base 
for many left parties, in these typologies popular movements effectively replaced labour 
as the more significant social and political actor (Lievesley 2005; Petras and Veltmeyer 
2009). Labour unions were discussed mostly in terms of their past prominence and 
subsequent demise (Levitsky 2001; Roberts 2002; Barrett, Chavez, and Rodríguez-
Garavito 2008). Those analysts who did consider the relationship between the Left and 
labour suggested that even though the relationship persisted, it was diminished 
(Etchemedy and Collier 2007; Levitsky and Roberts 2011). 
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We contend that this relegation of labour unions to the political margins has left a 
significant gap in the literature on the Latin American Left in power. We argue that an 
examination of left governments’ labour policies and of their relations with labour unions 
gives us a better grasp on the distinctiveness of these regimes. Whereas the roots of these 
governments’ economic and social policies lie in the neoliberal era, thus underscoring 
continuities, analysing labour policies allows us to identify the ways in which some left 
governments break with the policies of that period. Marginalizing labour in the analysis 
of left governments has also led scholars to miss important differences within typologies 
and to overlook novel developments regarding labour’s relations with left parties and the 
state. 
In the remainder of this paper we develop these arguments in two main sections. 
First, we undertake a brief review of the literature on left governments, focusing on how 
the absence of attention to labour hinders our understanding of 1) the differences between 
left administrations and the preceding neoliberal governments and 2) differences across 
left governments, including within categories or typologies discussed in recent literature. 
Second, we review initiatives in labour policy and legislation undertaken by left-of-centre 
governments in four countries—Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina—to provide 
evidence for our main argument that a labour lens matters. The conclusion discusses how 
an approach that ‘brings unions back in’ changes the way we think about left regimes in 
the region. 
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What Is Left? Continuity, Change, and Difference Among Left 
Governments 
For many observers, the rise of left governments seemed to reflect a rejection of the 
previous decade’s neoliberal policies (Barrett, Chavez, and Rodríguez-Garavito 2008; 
Moreno-Brid and Paunovic 2008). While some have argued instead that voters simply 
punished conservative governments for failing to create strong economic growth 
(Murillo, Oliveros, Vaishnav 2010), others claim that the election of left governments 
signified a mandate for change and gave left governments more political space to 
moderate the neoliberal policies of their predecessors (Baker and Greene 2011). For 
instance, aided by the mid-decade commodity boom, left governments were able to 
increase social spending and some pursued what Roberts (2008) has termed a ‘social-
democratic’ agenda. Yet, at the same time, many left governments maintained the 
macroeconomic policies of previous conservative governments. Even so-called radical 
left governments focused more on macroeconomic stability and fiscal restraint than did 
previous left regimes (Kaufman 2011). In short, left governments largely avoided sharp 
breaks with the macroeconomic policies of the neoliberal decade (Flores-Macias 2012; 
Cook 2011). 
What, then, makes these governments of the Left? Even within ‘well-defined 
structural and institutional constraints’, left governments are ideologically committed to 
improving social inequalities and expanding social citizenship rights (Roberts 2008: 216). 
As evidence of this commitment, many governments initiated or expanded social 
assistance programs. In Chile the Lagos government began a targeted poverty assistance 
program that Bachelet later expanded, and both governments extended the coverage of 
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health care and social security. The Lula government in Brazil extended the previous 
government’s social assistance programs in ways that helped reduce the percentage of 
people below the poverty line. The government of Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay provided 
subsidies for low-income families and began a family allowance program. It also 
expanded pension eligibility and access to health care (Roberts 2008; Cook 2011). In 
Argentina Néstor Kirchner expanded a basic social assistance program begun after the 
Argentine financial crisis, adding employment and training opportunities for 
beneficiaries. 
But targeted poverty-relief measures and related social policies are not in 
themselves enough to declare a break with the neoliberal model of development. 
International financial institutions promoted many such policies alongside market 
reforms as a way to soften their effects while proving more efficient and cost-effective 
than universal programs. In many cases, left governments have simply expanded anti-
poverty programs begun under their more conservative predecessors. Due to this past 
connection, the literature’s emphasis on social policies has frustrated efforts to identify 
how the Left’s policies signal a break with neoliberal governments. 
A related challenge has been how to characterise differences among left regimes. 
Much of the left-typologies literature emerged in response to the ‘good’ (social 
democratic) and ‘bad’ (populist) left thesis championed by Jorge Castañeda (Castañeda 
2006; Castañeda and Morales 2008). Scholars suggested that this framework was too 
normative, yet then went on to group left governments under similar dichotomies. For 
example, the ‘cautious’ left governments of Brazil and Chile were contrasted with 
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‘radical’ or ‘contestatory’ regimes in Bolivia and Venezuela (Weyland, Madrid, and 
Hunter 2010; Cameron and Hershberg 2010). 
In an effort to clarify the distinction between the left and the rest, we bring unions 
back into the analysis of left government policies and orientations. Doing so allows us to 
make three key contributions to the literature on left regimes in Latin America. First, we 
argue that labour policies can provide clearer evidence of discontinuity with policies of 
past governments. In the 1990s neoliberal policies were generally more hostile to labour 
unions and workers’ concerns. Under neoliberalism real wages either declined or 
recovered very slowly from their nadir in the 1980s, union membership fell, and the size 
of the informal workforce expanded (ILO 2002). Labour reforms reduced individual 
protections, while weak enforcement and market pressures undermined collective rights 
that were still recognised in law (Cook 2007). Labour unions were largely excluded from 
policymaking, and labour-based parties’ relations with unions were strained (Burgess 
2004). Hence, while many anti-poverty policies may be seen as consistent with policy 
recommendations of the World Bank and the IMF in the 1990s, most pro-labour and pro-
union policies were anathema to the neoliberal agenda (Cook 2011). 
Second, we argue that using a labour lens upsets the categories and typologies that 
have been developed to discuss and differentiate left regimes in the region. As we note 
above, few of the many typologies of the left discuss labour policy. Most take for granted 
the relationship between labour and the left, or else they see pro-labour policies as 
evidence of older patterns of populism (Etchemendy and Garay 2011). Our focus on 
labour policy reveals important differences within categories established by other 
scholars. For example, scholars have tended to group together Chile and Brazil as 
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‘moderate left’ countries, noting their comparable experiences in maintaining economic 
growth and combating inequality (Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010), or the 
‘professionalization’ of their respective parties and deactivation of grassroots supporters 
(Levitsky and Roberts 2011). Yet we show that Chile and Brazil embarked on very 
different labour policy trajectories. Similarly, despite important differences in the party 
structures and histories of Uruguay and Argentina (Levitsky and Roberts 2011), we note 
that these countries share a commitment to stronger collective representation for labour. 
Finally, we show that instead of a return to populism, changes in some countries 
suggest that a different relationship is emerging among unions, employers, and the state. 
Some elements of this difference include the state’s promotion of collective rights of 
workers, the search for greater balance in labour-employer relations, and strengthening of 
collective bargaining as a means to resolve conflict between workers and management. 
Left government support for the institution of collective bargaining has entailed, in turn, 
policies that strengthen unions and bolster their autonomy vis-à-vis the state. While these 
developments do not necessarily imply that populism or corporatism is absent, they are 
too important to cover over with these labels. What is emerging in the relationship 
between labour and the state may be closer to the hybrid ‘post-liberalism’ that Arditi 
(2010) describes. Arditi (2010: 159) uses the term post-liberal to suggest that left 
governments, rather than being anti-liberal, support such liberal traditions as civil 
liberties, electoral politics, and even international trade. Although Arditi does not 
specifically refer to labour policies, we see some left governments’ labour policies as 
more consistent with liberal-pluralist notions of group relations than with revivals of 
populism or corporatism. Yet the situation differs from traditional pluralism in that the 
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state remains actively involved in shaping a more balanced institutional, legal, and 
resource environment for unions’ interactions with employers. It is this emerging and 
hybrid situation that leads us to use ‘post-liberal’ to refer to these developments under the 
Left. Here we note left governments’ expanded commitment to equality and social 
cohesion—but also to increased union autonomy and collective, not just individual, 
rights—within the boundaries of a market-based economic model. 
We focus on four countries—Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina—for a couple 
of reasons. First, typologies of left governments have often grouped these countries 
together in recognition that they differ more sharply from other left regimes in the region, 
such as those led by Evo Morales in Bolivia and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (Panizza 
2005). Second, none of these countries has significantly changed the macroeconomic 
policies of previous governments, although Argentina comes closest (Flores-Macias 
2012). Looking at these countries’ economic and social policies may not reveal 
significant differences among them nor important differences with past non-left regimes. 
Yet because labour has historically been a concern of the Left, analysing the labour 
policies of these regimes should give us a better sense of whether and how these left 
governments differ from their neoliberal predecessors, as well as a clearer understanding 
of differences within this ‘moderate left’ grouping. 
Although a detailed explanation of the underlying causes of similarities and 
differences among these cases lies beyond the scope of this article, we do identify some 
factors that may account for these similarities and differences in the hope that they will 
be explored in future studies of left regimes in the region. Finally, while we believe that 
our focus on labour policies helps to unsettle existing typologies, it is not our intention 
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here to create new typologies based on different approaches to labour. Instead, we limit 
our analysis to signalling the importance of an overlooked dimension—unions and labour 
policy—for the Left in Latin America, and to showing how existing typologies have 
obscured key features of left regimes in the region. 
Unions and Labour Policy under Left Governments 
We identify five areas in which changes that potentially benefit workers and unions may 
be assessed: 1) wage policy, 2) legal reform and enforcement, 3) collective bargaining, 4) 
social dialogue, and 5) unionization. Governments that improve, implement, or support 
any of these areas can be said to be acting favourably towards labour. We also distinguish 
between areas that are primarily oriented toward enhancing resources for individual 
workers and those that are more clearly oriented toward enhancement of collective 
resources. Although there is a relationship between the two, we argue that the extent to 
which governments enhance resources of unions and not just of workers indicates a 
sharper break with the policies of the previous decade (Cook 2011). For example, 
minimum wage policy and labour law enforcement tend to benefit all workers, but in the 
absence of measures to boost collective rights, they signal a primary commitment to the 
welfare of individual workers. Conversely, strengthening collective bargaining, fostering 
social dialogue and inclusion in policymaking, and promoting unionization indicate 
support for the role that unions play in the economy and society (Cook 2011). 
Governments can also shape the institutional and policy arena in ways that enable the 
measured use of strikes in the course of conflict resolution and expand formal-sector 
employment. Our review includes these additional factors as part of our effort to assess 
favourable environments for unions in each of these countries. 
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Our four cases represent a spectrum of labour policy experiences (see Table 1; 
Figure 1). On one end of the spectrum, the Left in Chile has continued the neoliberal 
model: the pro-labour policies of the Concertación focused on individual protections, not 
collective rights. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Argentina and Uruguay 
strengthened institutions for workers’ collective representation and unions in those 
countries have experienced a resurgence unlike any seen in recent decades. We situate 
Brazil in between these poles. Though the ruling party in Brazil has roots in the labour 
movement and unions remain important actors, key labour reforms failed to materialise 
and critics charge that labour has lost its initiative vis-à-vis the government. Nonetheless, 
Brazil’s expansion of formal employment and union density are more similar to 
Argentina and Uruguay than to Chile. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We now turn to examine labour policies in each of the four country cases and 
assess the extent to which left governments pursue the enhancement of collective (union) 
resources as well as individual resources of workers. 
Chile: Social Policy Without Labour Policy 
In Chile a coalition of centre-left parties (the Concertación) was in power for two 
decades, from Chile’s 1990 democratic transition until 2010, when Sebastian Piñera of 
the conservative National Renewal party was elected. Chile’s ‘left’ rule, however, dates 
from 2000, when Socialist Ricardo Lagos was elected president, and continued through 
the administration of Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010). Both Lagos and Bachelet increased 
social spending and expanded the social safety net, improving conditions for workers in 
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both formal and informal employment and for those in previously excluded sectors, such 
as women and youth. Yet government policies primarily targeted workers as individuals 
and did not enhance workers’ ability to pursue their collective interests via legal and 
institutional reforms (Cook 2011). 
Both the Lagos and Bachelet administrations increased the breadth of social 
programs. The Lagos government initiated an unemployment insurance program and 
Bachelet expanded the benefits and coverage of the program to include fixed-term 
contract workers as well as those on indefinite contracts. In 2004, 42 percent of the 
economically active population was potentially covered by unemployment insurance 
(Aravena and Núñez 2011). In addition, Bachelet’s pension reform extended benefits 
such as family allowances and workers’ compensation to informal-sector workers, but did 
so by requiring both informal and formal-sector workers to contribute to government-
facilitated individual savings plans. Finally, both Lagos and Bachelet provided annual 
increases to the minimum wage, which has doubled since the 1990 transition (Pribble and 
Huber 2011; see Figure 2). 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
These and other social programs have helped to reduce poverty in Chile (Mesa-
Lago 2008; Olavarria-Gambi 2009; Cornia 2010). Moreover, unemployment declined 
throughout the decade (except in 2008-09, during the global financial crisis). However, 
other indicators point to persistent levels of precarity in the labour market. Throughout 
the 2000s, the number of workers on fixed-term contracts increased, and even before the 
financial crisis fully hit the region, 37 percent of workers earned no more than 1.5 times 
the monthly minimum wage (Aravena and Núñez 2011). 
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Left governments in Chile worked to improve enforcement of labour law. They 
expanded the powers and practical reach of government labour inspectors by granting 
greater authority to inspectors and providing funding to enforce labour protections. The 
Lagos government increased the number of labour inspectors and judges, and expanded 
the Labour Directorate’s jurisdiction (Cook 2007). Bachelet more than doubled the 
number of labour court magistrates. She also increased the number of specialised labour 
tribunals in order to expedite proceedings, whose average length was reduced from four 
to five years to a few months (Posner 2008; Cook 2011). Indeed, reforms to the system of 
labour justice were among the most important to have been undertaken in years (Aravena 
and Núñez 2011). 
Nonetheless, neither the Lagos nor Bachelet governments implemented major 
labour law changes in the area of collective rights. The Lagos government did introduce 
some legal improvements and protections for workers’ collective actions, such as 
protection against dismissal for workers involved in collective bargaining, greater access 
to company information during bargaining, and increased fines for unjustified dismissals 
and anti-union practices. However, these improvements failed to address unions’ 
longstanding demands, especially in the areas of strikes and collective bargaining 
(Aravena and Núñez 2011). For instance, employers could still hire replacement workers 
during strikes (although they were now required to pay a bond), and employees could still 
be fired at will if employers claimed that dismissal was necessary for the efficient 
functioning of the firm. In addition, collective bargaining remained decentralised, inter-
enterprise bargaining continued to face obstacles, and non-union bargaining groups were 
still used to undercut unions in workplace bargaining (Frank 2004; Cook 2011). 
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Moreover, the scope of bargaining in Chile was still limited largely to wage adjustments, 
which had seen only modest improvements since 1990. The weakness of collective 
bargaining overall was perhaps best reflected in the continued decline in the number of 
workers covered by collective bargaining agreements, which fell from 7.6 percent in 
1990 to 5.9 percent in 2009 (Aravena and Núñez 2011). 
Under Bachelet efforts to extend labour protections and to address collective 
rights were thwarted by strong opposition from employers and their political allies. For 
instance, a potentially far-reaching initiative, the 2006 Law on Subcontracting and 
Transitory Labour, would have extended labour protections to informal and 
subcontracted employees. The bill imposed a subsidiary obligation on principal 
enterprises for employees’ health and safety and set limits on the use of temporary 
workers. Yet the bill faced significant opposition in Congress and was eventually watered 
down. The law’s effectiveness was further reduced in a 2008 Supreme Court ruling 
involving CODELCO, the state-run copper company (Aravena and Núñez 2011; Posner 
2008). In another example, the Bachelet government established a multipartite 
Presidential Advisory Council on Work and Equity in 2007 in order to develop proposals 
for labour reform. But the council failed to address the issues of striker replacement and 
the scope and level of collective bargaining. Moreover, unions refused to participate, 
claiming that the exercise was purely bureaucratic (Consejo Asesor Presidencial Trabajo 
y Equidad 2008; Posner 2008). 
Overall, organised labour’s political clout has been limited since the transition. 
Labour unions’ links to the parties in the Concertación have grown more distant over 
time (Frank 2004). Within the labour movement, the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores 
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(CUT) has been unable to mobilise broad support for general strikes even as it has called 
for more such strikes in recent years. Political weakness reflects in part the growing 
fragmentation of labour. Although the total number of unions has increased since 2001, 
when a law lowered the minimum number of workers required to form a union, the 
average number of workers per union has declined (Aravena and Núñez 2011). Similarly, 
union density has continued to fall under the Concertación governments: from a post-
transition peak of 21.2 percent in 1991, unionization rates declined to 14.8 percent in 
2008 (Arrau et al 2008; Cook 2011). 
In the end, viewing the Lagos and Bachelet governments through a labour lens 
yields little evidence of ruptures with the policies of Concertación governments of the 
1990s. Indeed, core elements of Chilean labour law remain unchanged from the 
dictatorship (Frank 2004). Although Socialist administrations expanded targeted social 
programs, increased the minimum wage, and put more resources into labour enforcement, 
they did not expand the collective resources of unions nor did they inject more balance 
into the relationship between labour and employers (Cook 2011). 
More than the other cases discussed here, the neoliberal economic model—a 
legacy of the Pinochet dictatorship—was more consolidated and accepted by political 
elites, including members of the Concertación. This economic legacy of the dictatorship 
was also reflected in the presence of strong employer groups and their conservative party 
allies, on the one hand, and weak unions, on the other (Frank 2004). The conservative 
legacy was manifest in the widespread resistance among employers and political elites to 
collective labour reform, further limiting what was possible to achieve under the Left. For 
labour, Chile’s ‘left-turn’ was barely a turn at all. 
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Brazil: The Ambivalence of Power 
The election of Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva, a former autoworker and union 
leader, to the presidency in 2002 ushered in a period of optimism for the Left and for 
Brazilian workers. The Lula government advanced social policy in a number of areas, 
including income-support programs for poor families and a campaign to end slave labour. 
Together with steady increases in the minimum wage, targeted social-policy programs 
dramatically reduced the level of poverty in Brazil. These policies also earned Lula an 
important base of support among the poor and less educated that proved key to his second 
electoral victory in 2006 (Hunter and Power 2007; Cook 2011). While these social 
policies were popular, they did not break with the neoliberal policies of previous 
governments. 
The Lula government was committed to improving the minimum wage. Between 
2003 and 2006 the real minimum wage increased over 25 percent (Rodrigues, Ramalho, 
and da Conceicão 2008: 55-56), and over the course of both Lula administrations (2003-
10) it increased 54 percent. By January 2011 the minimum wage had recovered the value 
it had in 1986 and was at its highest point in 25 years (DIEESE 2011). Yet it was only 
after labour centrals had organised a coordinated campaign, with three separate marches 
to the capital between 2004 and 2006, that the government formed a multipartite 
commission to oversee a policy of continuous adjustment of the minimum wage. The 
result was that while the earliest real minimum wage adjustments were relatively modest 
(e.g. 1.23 percent in 2002), those in the later years of Lula’s administration were 
significantly higher in real terms (Araujo and de Oliveira 2011). 
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In addition to minimum wage improvements, the Lula administration provided a 
positive environment for wage gains through collective bargaining. In 2003 public 
administration employees were involved in wage negotiations for the first time. They 
were then able to initiate a recovery of wages that had fallen steadily under the 
administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Real wages for workers in public 
administration grew by 56 percent between 2003 and 2009 (Araujo and de Oliveira 
2011). Nonetheless, workers in public administration were concerned about employment 
losses associated with pension reform, evidenced by the higher levels of conflict 
experienced in this sector. Private-sector wage gains attained through collective 
bargaining were also important under the Lula government. Between 2004 and 2009, 
eighty percent of agreements included wage increases above the level of inflation (Araujo 
and de Oliveira 2011). 
These advances in collective contracts were undergirded by gains in formal-sector 
job creation. Formal sector employment grew every year between 2003 and 2009 
(DIEESE 2010). Employment grew by 56 percent between 1998 and 2007, with two-
thirds of these jobs created between 2003-07 (Araujo and de Oliveira 2011: 99). Other 
indicators of increased formal employment also showed gains during Lula’s tenure. For 
example, the percentage of workers who contributed to social security increased from 
61.2 percent in 2003 to 65.8 percent in 2008 (DIEESE 2010). Informal employment 
decreased as the number of workers involved in own-account work and those without an 
official ‘work book’ (carteira registrada) declined. Open unemployment also fell 
consistently throughout Lula’s two administrations. While there was a small hike in 
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unemployment in 2009 as a result of the effects of the global financial crisis, by 2010 
unemployment had returned to its pre-crisis levels at 7.8 percent. 
A major focus of the Lula government was the inclusion of societal groups in 
institutional spaces where dialogue and consensus could take place. The process adopted 
by the Lula government of ‘democratizing’ policy-making by expanding participation in 
policy fora signalled an important break with similar reform efforts under the Cardoso 
government (Cook 2011). Lula’s commitment to including unions in these participatory 
spaces was evident in his creation of the National Board for Collective Bargaining for 
federal employees and the National Forum for Social Welfare (previdencia). In addition, 
Lula included unions in ministerial conferences that focused on the areas of work and 
employment, health, education, communications, environment, and urban areas, among 
others (Araujo and de Oliveira 2011). 
Among the most important of these participatory instances were the Councils for 
Economic and Social Development (CDES) and the National Labour Forum (FNT). The 
CDES consisted of multipartite structures formed around discussions of labour, social 
security, and tax reforms, while the FNT created a space for social dialogue around 
labour reform (Cook 2007). Significantly, discussions for labour reform that included 
guarantees for unions’ organizational integrity and collective rights were carried out 
within these tripartite and multipartite settings. 
The government initially set out to address the need for a broad reform of the 
Brazilian labour relations system and spent considerable time and effort to develop 
consensus around a set of labour reform proposals. Yet resistance from Congress and a 
political crisis in the last year of Lula’s first term kept the labour reforms from advancing 
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(Zylberstajn 2005). These proposed reforms would have dismantled some of the core 
corporatist provisions in Brazilian labour legislation, including unicidade and the imposto 
sindical, and they would have allowed workplace-level union representation, long a 
union demand (Cook 2007). In Lula’s second term some specific changes in labour law 
were re-introduced, yet they did not signal the transformation that the earlier process had 
promised. Employers were able to block other issues on the union agenda, including 
proposals to regulate subcontracting and reduce work hours (Rodrigues, Ramalho, and da 
Conceicão 2008: 55, 57). Nonetheless, in 2008 the government did pass a law giving 
union centrals legal recognition, a status that had eluded them for years. With legal 
recognition union centrals were now able to coordinate and devise action policies for 
their affiliates as well as act in the name of workers in various tripartite forums. Centrals 
were also entitled to ten percent of the contribution collected from workers through the 
union tax (Araujo and de Oliveira 2011). While the legalization of union centrals was a 
significant boost to these organizations, relaxation of regulations on union formation 
meant that many new unions were created, leading to further fragmentation of an already 
fragmented labour movement. 
In this environment, unionization rates in Brazil increased steadily during the 
2000s. From 15.9 percent in 1998 the percentage of the workforce in unions climbed to 
17.7 percent in 2003 and to 18.4 percent in 2005 (DIEESE 2005, 2006). An analysis of 
data from household surveys confirms this trend, reflecting a net increase in union 
membership of 53.4 percent between 1992 and 2008 (Pichler 2011). Union density grew 
the most in rural areas and female membership accounted for sixty percent of all new 
union members in this period. This increase in union density among female workers and 
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in rural areas suggests both positive employment growth in the 2000s and unions’ ability 
to recruit new members (Pichler 2011). More importantly, these developments signal the 
critical role of the government’s favourable position on unionization. 
The downward trend in strikes initiated under the previous government continued 
under Lula (ILO LABORSTA). Nevertheless, there were a greater number of public-
sector strikes each year compared with the private sector (except for 2008), reversing the 
trend of more private-sector strikes between 1978 and 2002 (DIEESE 2009). Strikes 
under Lula also lasted longer on average. A notable feature of these strikes was that the 
majority sought either to expand already established provisions or to create new rights; 
relatively few strikes were defensive. Most strikes also resulted in negotiated outcomes 
that proved favourable to labour. Only thirty percent of strikes saw resolution in the 
labour courts (Araujo and de Oliveira 2011). This scenario suggests the 
institutionalization of collective bargaining as a way to resolve conflict between workers 
and employers. 
Despite implementation of a number of initiatives important to workers and poor 
Brazilians, the labour movement’s support for Lula became strained. Many came to see 
him as a moderate leader, especially with regard to economic policy and pension reform 
(Cámara Neto and Vernengo 2007; Marques and Mendes 2007; Cook 2011). Others 
suggested that unions were too passive and that they followed the lead of the Lula 
government rather than take the initiative on issues of importance to labour (Araujo and 
de Oliveira 2011). Many union leaders were absorbed into government and the Central 
Unica dos Trabalhadores (CUT), in particular, did not want to do anything that might 
weaken the Lula administration. Union leadership support for the government 
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exacerbated tensions within the labour movement and led some factions to split from the 
CUT to form more combative labour centrals (Sluyter-Beltrão 2010). 
Brazil represents a mixed case from the perspective of labour policy and relations 
with unions. Although union influence in the Lula administration was unprecedented, 
longstanding legal reform demands were not realised and the administration remained 
sensitive to employer opposition. At the same time, some unions grew more cautious in 
their dealings with the government, while others who were more critical of the 
administration’s moderate economic and social policies withdrew their support. At no 
point had the labour movement in Brazil been closer to power, yet that proximity yielded 
ambivalent results for labour. 
Uruguay: Promoting Union Autonomy and Collective Bargaining 
Together with Argentina, Uruguay represents the clearest case of how left 
governments can develop labour policies that benefit both workers and unions. The 
policies of the Frente Amplio governments of Tabaré Vázquez (2005-09) and José 
Mujica (2009- ) not only helped to reduce social inequality and poverty (Pribble and 
Huber 2011), but they also arguably restored labour unions to their former central role in 
Uruguayan society, economy, and politics (Cook 2011). 
As with Argentina, the backdrop to the emergence of a more labour-friendly 
government was the economic crisis, which in Uruguay lasted from 1998 to 2003. The 
impact of the crisis on workers’ wages and employment was especially harsh. Average 
annual unemployment between 2000 and 2004 was above 13 percent, and real wages 
dropped by nearly 20 percent in a single year (2002) (Instituto Nacional de Estadística). 
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Informality and precariousness also increased in the period of market reform in the 1990s 
(Cook 2011). 
Economic recovery began in 2003, with 12 percent GDP growth in 2004, the 
highest in thirty years. Although unemployment remained high at around 12 percent in 
2005, by 2011 it had dropped to 6.4 percent, an historic low (OIT 2011). Moreover, real 
wages began to increase in 2004 and 2005, largely as a result of the reintroduction of 
sectoral, tripartite wage councils by the Vázquez government (see Figure 2). The 
government also expanded the reach of these councils by including rural and domestic 
workers for the first time (Cook 2011). 
The effects of the crisis led the Vázquez government to invest heavily in anti-
poverty programs. In 2005 it established a social emergency plan for indigent families, 
and in 2007 a new program increased the family allowance and made it conditional upon 
a child’s attendance in school. The government also lowered the age requirement for the 
social assistance pension and offered subsidies to employers that hired unemployed 
members of poor households (Pribble and Huber 2011). 
In addition to social policies, the Vázquez government implemented legal reforms 
that benefited workers and unions. For example, it expanded resources for labour 
inspection and established a Work Observatory to monitor the labour market and assess 
training needs. Further, in contrast to Chile, where a similar bill was watered down, the 
administration instituted a law on subcontracting that held employers legally responsible 
for the conditions of subcontracted workers. In the area of collective labour rights, the 
Vázquez government reversed an earlier law that prohibited workers from occupying a 
workplace during a labour conflict, framing this as a right to strike issue. The 
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administration also made explicit its support for union organizing through its adoption of 
a law that protected workers against dismissals for union activity (Amorín 2008). 
The collective bargaining rights of workers were also strengthened in an effort by 
the government to encourage more self-resolution of conflicts through bargaining 
(Amorín 2008). To this end, the Vázquez administration created a separate space for 
bargaining with public-sector employees, and it established a national system of 
collective bargaining for both public and private-sector workers that consisted of multiple 
tiers linking national, sectoral, and firm levels. The Vázquez government worked closely 
with the ILO in these efforts, taking seriously the ILO’s promotion of social dialogue 
(Senatore Camerota 2009). One example was the establishment of a tripartite forum on 
job creation and national production, known as the National Commitment for 
Employment, Income, and Responsibilities (Amorín 2008; Cook 2011). 
The government’s push for self-regulation in the resolution of conflicts came with 
the recognition that worker organizations needed strengthening. According to Vazquez’s 
labour minister, Eduardo Bonomí, the government’s ‘union rights promotion policy’ was 
needed in order to level inequities between workers and employers so as to achieve more 
effective bargaining. Bonomí added, ‘with all these instruments what we want is to move 
increasingly towards self-regulation, with the State participating less and less. But to 
reach this self-regulation we need to attain a balance first, and that’s what we’re working 
on’ (Amorín 2008; Cook 2011). 
As an indication of the improved climate for labour, unionization rates increased 
dramatically in Uruguay, as did collective bargaining coverage. While union density rates 
remain below what they were before the dictatorship, unionization increased after 2003, 
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with the fastest growth occurring in the private sector (Senatore Camerota 2009: 68-69; 
Cook 2011). In 2006, 10 percent of private sector workers and 42 percent of public sector 
workers were affiliated with a union. Yet forty percent of those private-sector workers 
who joined unions did so between 2004 and 2006 (whereas the jump in public sector 
unionism occurred between 1985 and 1987 during the democratic transition) (Quiñones 
Montero 2011). The more recent expansion of union membership occurred both in 
already established unions and through an increase in the number of new unions. Many of 
these unions formed in sectors and in firms that were not previously organised or where 
unionism had declined (Quiñones Montero 2011). In addition, nearly all formal sector 
workers were covered by some form of collective agreement in 2008, up from 16 percent 
in 2000 (Mazzuchi 2009: 79-80). 
Whereas Uruguay’s largest union confederation, the Plenario Intersindical de 
Trabajadores–Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (PIT-CNT) has long been aligned 
with the political left, it has remained largely autonomous from the state and political 
parties. During the economic restructuring of the 1990s, the labour movement emerged as 
an ally and sometimes competitor of the Frente Amplio in its opposition to neoliberal 
reforms (Quiñones Montero 2011). The PIT-CNT differed with the Frente Amplio 
government headed by Vázquez over wage policies and launched several general strikes 
calling for changes in economic policy. Public-sector unions, in particular, criticised 
Vázquez’s attempts to reform healthcare and the education system (Barca 2008). The 
PIT-CNT also called for the government to direct a larger share of the national budget to 
education, lobbied for a larger increase in the national minimum wage, and opposed a 
free trade agreement with the United States. Still, there was a notable convergence in the 
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priorities of the labour movement and the Frente Amplio government. Moreover, the PIT-
CNT and some of the parties that comprised the Frente Amplio shared leadership as well 
as programmatic and tactical convergence (Quiñones Montero 2011). 
In sum, left governments in Uruguay have built up the unions’ organizational 
resources while doing little to limit their power, and they have done so in spite of 
employer opposition. This stance indicates a shift in approach toward labour policy and 
unions, one characterised by an enhanced role for collective bargaining, an effort to 
create greater balance between unions and employers, and a more limited involvement by 
the state in the direct resolution of conflict. 
Argentina: Union Resurgence 
The Peronist party (Partido Justicialista) has been in power in Argentina since 
Carlos Saúl Menem was elected in 1989, yet only after Néstor Kirchner’s election in 
2003 did Argentina become part of the region’s ‘left turn’ (Levitsky and Roberts 2011; 
Cameron and Hershberg 2010; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010). After more than a 
decade of neoliberal reforms under Menem and Radical party President Fernando de la 
Rúa, and in the wake of the devastating economic crisis of 2001-02, Kirchner adopted 
more heterodox economic policies and took a stand against the IMF, a move that gained 
him popular support. In the labour arena, the Kirchner government was also friendlier to 
labour unions than these previous governments had been (Cook 2011). President Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner (2007- ) initially shared her husband’s commitment to social 
policies and to the party’s labour base. Although strains between labour unions and the 
government developed after Fernández was re-elected for a second term in October 2011, 
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the labour ministry staff that forged favourable ties with unions under Néstor Kirchner 
remained in place in the Fernández government (Cook 2011). 
The market reforms of the 1990s, coupled with the impact of the 2001-02 
economic crisis, weakened labour. High unemployment, industrial restructuring, informal 
sector expansion and an increasingly decentralised bargaining structure all took their toll. 
Yet labour was able to defend some institutional and legal arrangements that helped to 
preserve its organizational resources. Chief among these was the retention of collective 
bargaining coverage for non-union workers, centralised and articulated bargaining, and 
union control over the obras sociales, a key source of financial resources for the unions 
(Murillo 2005; Cook 2007). As a result, when economic recovery began in 2003-04, 
organised labour was in a better position to press for gains in wages and institutional 
resources (Etchemendy and Collier 2007; Senén González 2011). For example, under 
Kirchner the Congress replaced a controversial labour reform package passed under de la 
Rúa with more labour-friendly legislation (Cook 2007). 
To emerge from the crisis, the Kirchner government aimed to increase industrial 
production and expand the domestic market by improving the purchasing power of 
workers (Senén González 2011). The government’s labour and employment policies 
centred on two areas: increasing the minimum wage and strengthening collective 
bargaining. Between 2000 and 2010 the real minimum wage grew by 321 percent (OIT 
2011; see Figure 2). In the 2000s wages also became the most negotiated item in 
collective bargaining agreements compared with the 1990s, which saw bargaining focus 
on flexibility clauses. Between 2002 and 2008 all collective agreements included wage 
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increases, and pattern bargaining was a key feature of wage negotiations between 2006 
and 2008 (Senén González 2011). 
The Kirchner and Fernández administrations broadened their support for 
collective bargaining more generally. Both governments actively participated in the 
comisiones paritarias, which oversaw the renewal of collective agreements. One result 
was that the number of collective bargaining agreements tripled between 2003 and 2008, 
and the percentage of the formal workforce covered by collective bargaining agreements 
increased (Senén González 2011). Survey results from 2005 indicate that 90 percent of 
firms signed some form of collective agreement with their workers, and 83 percent of 
workers were covered by a collective bargaining agreement, though only 37 percent of 
workers in formal-sector firms were officially union members (Etchemendy and Collier 
2007). Using more recent survey data, Senén González (2011) notes that 87.5 percent of 
all registered wage employees in the private sector were covered by collective bargaining 
agreements in 2010. 
The trend toward decentralization of collective bargaining that began in the 1990s 
started to reverse itself in the 2000s. In this period the number of sectoral bargaining 
agreements increased, as did the number of plant-level agreements. But the trends for 
each point in opposite directions: compared to the total number of contracts, the 
percentage of sector-wide collective agreements increased by 174 percent since 2002, 
whereas the percentage of plant-level agreements decreased by almost one-third in the 
same period (Etchemendy and Collier 2007). Since unions often oppose decentralised 
bargaining in favour of more centralised or coordinated bargaining, this shift reflects a 
positive development for unions. 
26 
Collective bargaining has become the primary institution through which social 
dialogue on matters of compensation and distribution takes place. But the Kirchner and 
Fernández governments also expanded fora for social dialogue in related areas. For 
example, the government revived the Minimum Wage Council (Consejo del Salario 
Mínimo Vital y Móvil), composed of unions, employer organizations, and the labour 
ministry (Senén González 2011). Participants in the council included the Central de los 
Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA), a rival confederation to the Confederación General del 
Trabajo (CGT) that had previously been excluded from such fora. Employer 
organizations like the Unión Industrial Argentina (UIA) and the Cámara Argentina del 
Comercio also participated for the first time. 
Union membership also appears to have increased in recent years, although 
comparable long-term membership data are not available. In general, sources show a 
decline of union density in the 1990s and an increase in the 2000s. For 2005-2008, data 
based on the Encuesta de Indicadores Laborales show union density rates of 37 percent in 
2005, 39.7 percent in 2006, and 37 percent in 2008 (Senén González 2011). These are 
high rates compared to the rest of the region, and especially given that union membership 
in Argentina is voluntary (Marshall 2005). 
As in Brazil, the Argentine government also successfully expanded formal-sector 
employment. Between 2003 and 2005 the rate of growth of employment covered by 
collective agreements (an indicator of formal employment) was 10 percent annually, 
followed by an 8 percent annual growth rate in 2006 and 2007 (Senén González 2011). In 
2011 unemployment fell to 7.3 percent from a high of 21.5 percent during the crisis in 
2002 (OIT 2011). In addition, the labour ministry claimed to pursue employment-
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promotion policies that were based on ‘an ethical concept of work’. Labour Minister 
Carlos Tomada touted this shift as the sign of ‘an Argentina that has once again situated 
work as the source of rights of social inclusion for all’ (Senén González 2011). 
Finally, an increase in labour conflict signalled the resurgence of unions and the 
enhanced role of collective bargaining. Labour conflict as used here refers to all forms of 
pressure against employers and government with the aim of reaching the bargaining 
table, not only strikes and work stoppages. Labour conflict increased in the 2006-08 
period; after 2008 conflicts begin to coalesce around the economic branch (rama) as part 
of the bargaining process (Senén González 2011). Strike activity also increased in the 
manufacturing sector as a result of the state’s active promotion of industrial production 
and formal employment following economic recovery (Senén González 2011). 
The greater number of strikes and the changing nature of these indicated a more 
institutionalised form of pressure aimed at employers and focused largely on wage issues. 
A related development was the inclusion of no-strike clauses in many collective 
agreements (Etchemendy and Collier 2007). These clauses are typically added at the 
request of employers in order to ensure stability during the life of the contract. Strikes 
most likely occurred in the lead-up to new contract negotiations as a form of pressure to 
secure wage increases. Changes in strike laws have also been notable. The right to strike 
is recognised in the Argentine Constitution, but strikes in so-called essential services 
were prohibited altogether until passage of a new law in 2004 (Cook 2007: 97). This law 
now incorporates ILO standards regarding the right to strike: it forbids striker 
replacement, prohibits retaliation against strikers, and automatically recognises the 
legality of non-violent strikes (Senén González 2011). 
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The foregoing developments all point to a favourable environment for labour and 
to a resurgence of the Argentine labour movement compared to the 1990s and early 
2000s. Yet unlike analysts who see the more favourable environment for unions as 
indicative of a populist or neo-corporatist regime, we see a shift in a different direction. 
The Argentine government has strengthened collective bargaining, aligned strike laws 
with ILO standards, included formerly excluded labour organizations in tripartite 
institutions, and promoted overall adherence to ILO goals of ‘decent work’ and social 
inclusion through employment. Such policies reflect a ‘post-liberal politics’ (Arditi 2010) 
more than they do a return to populism or an expression of state corporatism. This is not 
to say that all vestiges of corporatism have disappeared or that populist appeals are absent 
or unlikely to re-emerge. But our review of labour policy suggests that casting the 
Argentine regime as simply a newer version of its past impedes our ability to capture 
significant developments that signal both a break with the past and possible new future 
directions. 
Conclusion 
The election of left governments in Latin America has not led to a radical reorientation of 
macroeconomic policies. Nor has left governments’ focus on redistributive social policies 
and public welfare programs signalled a break with neoliberalism, even though these 
have provided important benefits to poor and middle-income workers. Instead, the 
targeted anti-poverty programs implemented by many left governments are fully 
consistent with the compensatory social policies associated with market reforms. In other 
areas that entail a direct benefit to workers, such as labour law enforcement, left 
governments’ attention to improved enforcement through the allocation of more 
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resources is also consistent with the discourse on more efficient government and rule of 
law that accompanied market-oriented reforms (Cook 2011). Moreover, the commodities 
boom that began in the mid-2000s contributed to improvements in inequality, 
unemployment, and GDP across the region, regardless of governments’ political 
orientation. 
By looking through a labour lens, however, we show that some left governments 
have jettisoned neoliberal ideas about unions. In the 1990s union power was seen as an 
obstacle to growth, redistribution, and investment. In the 2000s the governments of 
Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil rejected the notion of a necessary trade-off between 
union strength and economic health. In these cases, left governments were committed to 
social dialogue and included labour in policymaking. They also supported legal reforms 
and policies that strengthened unions’ ability to engage in effective collective bargaining. 
Perhaps most significant, union membership began to grow after years of steady and 
often dramatic decline (Cook 2011). Governments’ policies toward unions, and especially 
the extent to which collective resources were expanded under the Left, point to more 
change than continuity in three of our four cases. These policies indicate a novel 
approach to unions, one that acknowledges the role that unions can play in improving the 
welfare of all workers. 
The tendency in the literature on left governments thus far has been to label pro-
union policies as examples of populism, suggesting that there is little new in the way that 
governments relate to unions. Yet reliance on such categories can lead us to miss novel 
developments. Past models of state-society relations associated with neoliberalism 
characterised these relations as technocratic, authoritarian, and focused on the individual 
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(Oxhorn 1998: 200-201). Under the Left, however, we see a shift toward what might be 
called a post-liberal politics (Arditi 2010), where governments show a commitment to 
improving social equality and to enhancing the collective rights of workers. Key 
elements of this approach include support for union autonomy in a context of increased 
institutional resources and legal protections; a greater reliance on collective bargaining, 
combined with an effort to promote the bargaining strength of trade unions; and a 
commitment to a more level playing field in labour-management relations. However, this 
is also a hybrid politics where populist and corporatist forms of mediation are present and 
aspects of neoliberalism persist. 
The degree to which these changes in labour policy have become difficult to 
reverse remains to be seen. Every election brings the potential for change, and the pro-
union policies discussed here are not immune to attack by future governments. Yet some 
of these changes represent qualitative shifts in institutions and practices that are likely to 
remain ‘sticky’ and resistant to rollback. Moreover, international labour developments 
such as an enhanced discourse around labour rights, recognition of a role for social 
dialogue, and greater attention to core ILO conventions in such areas as freedom of 
association and collective bargaining tend to reinforce such changes at the national level 
(Bronstein 2005). 
Using a labour lens also calls into question some of the typologies that have 
appeared in the scholarship on left governments. For instance, although the left 
governments of Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay are often grouped together as cases of social 
democracy (Panizza 2005; Roberts 2008), we see significant differences in their labour 
policies. While Chile’s left governments did little to enhance the collective rights of 
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workers, Uruguay and Brazil (and Argentina) have advanced in this area. We also see 
more similarities in labour policies between Argentina and Uruguay, whereas most 
typologies have placed Argentina outside of the moderate left. Both governments have 
promoted collective rights through an expansion of collective bargaining, social dialogue, 
and unionization. 
A more developed explanation for why these countries adopted the labour policies 
that they did under the Left lies beyond the scope of this article. In addition to the relative 
strength of unions, employers, and political party allies or opponents, such an explanation 
might take into account differences in labour law, union structure, and labour markets. 
These considerations might even form the basis for new categorizations of left regimes 
built on the role of unions and labour policy. Our goal, however, has been to show how 
an analysis of labour policy sharpens distinctions with neoliberal governments and 
unsettles existing typologies that have left labour out. For a fuller understanding of left 
regimes in the region, future studies will need to bring unions back in. 
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Figure 1. Labour Policies of Left Governments: A Comparison 
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